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Thousands of firms have adopted shareholder rights plans, also
known as poison pills.' These plans were initiated and promoted by
some of Wall Street's best-known corporate law firms, and their mod-
els have been almost slavishly followed by other lawyers across the
country.
From the beginning, rights plans were seen as the most powerful
of takeover defenses. 2 The Delaware Chancery Court has apparently
viewed them as preclusive deal killers that must be redeemed when
* Charles Howard Candler Professor, Emory University Law School.
t Partner, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP. The authors wish to thank Simon
Deakin, Ehud Kamar, Nelson Lacey, Peter Letsou, Fred S. McChesney, Randall
Thomas, Robert Thompson, David Westbrook, and participants at an Emory Law and
Economics Colloquium, the Vanderbilt Corporate Governance Workshop, the Eighth
Annual Meeting of the Multinational Finance Society, and the Eighteenth Annual
Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Richard J. Marsden, Emory Law
School, 1998, for his superb assistance with research and the calculations that form
the basis for this Article.
1 By December 1991, at least 1577 corporations had adopted rights plans. Rob-
ert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and
Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 11 (1995). As of 2002,
at least 2592 firms have rights plans in place. JoY MARLENE BRYAN, CORPORATE ANTI-
TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE app. A (2002). Institutional Sharehold-
ers Services (ISS) puts the number at over 3000. Shirley Westcott & Edward Seaton,
Bear Market Leads to Poison Pill Abuse 1 [hereinafter ISS Study] (on file with au-
thor). Of the 140 companies that adopted new rights plans in the first six months of
2001, 46% were technology companies. Kris Frieswick, Poison Pill Popping: The Latest
Hostile Takeover Defenses Defy the Usual Justifications, at http://www.cfo.com/Arti-
cle?article=5216 (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
2 See, e.g., RONALDJ. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAw AND FINANCE OF COR-
PORATE ACQUISITIONS 58 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) ("[The poison pill] effectively stops a
hostile tender offer . . . ."); Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002):
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threats are no longer serious. 3 Many financial economists undertook
studies of the stock price effects of these plans, and generally con-
cluded that these plans were indeed powerful takeover defenses.
4
Proxy fights, led by organizations such as College Retirement Equities
These rights are explicitly not exercisable by the acquiring person, so the
resulting dilution in his voting power and economic stake may make the
acquisition of the target through market purchases too expensive to pur-
sue .... In practice, then, the pill provides an impenetrable barrier to con-
trol acquisitions. As long as the pill remains in place, no other defensive
measures are necessary because the bid is completely blocked.
Id.; Steven J. Fink, The Rebirth of the Tender Offer? Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 20 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 133, 166 n.190 (1995) (referring to "preclusive
defenses such as a poison pill"); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
871, 875 (2002) (-[A] pill made a company takeover-proof unless redeemed by the
target board."); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Dis-
counted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 923 (1988) ("The
modern defensive tactics at the disposal of target managers-arranging from poison
pills to defensive capitalizations, street sweeps, and the assistance of state legisla-
tures-can sometimes defeat hostile bids outright."); Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC
and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 790 (1994) ("No bidder has
proceeded, or indeed can proceed, with a tender offer in the face of a poison pill,
because, if the pill is triggered, the resulting dilution is too great a cost for any bidder
to bear."); Park McGinty, Replacing Hostile Takeovers, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 983, 993
(1996) ("Today, management can normally prevent any unsolicited takeover it disfa-
vors . . . ."); Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests:
When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REv. 503, 505 n.6 (1993) ("Rights Plans
are one of the most powerful antitakeover defenses available to a target company....
Subsequently, their use has spread to precluding shareholders from accepting all-
cash, all-shares, premium-priced tender offers."); Gilbert L. Henry, Note, Continuing
Directors Provisions: These Next Generation Shareholder Rights Plans are Fair and Reasoned
Responses to Hostile Takeover Measures, 79 B.U. L. REV. 989, 991 (1999) ("Shareholder
rights plans, once triggered, massively dilute the target's shares and unacceptably
raise the bidder's cost of acquiring the target."). But seeJulian Velasco, Just Do It: An
Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849 passim (2003) (arguing that a bidder can
swallow a pill with a "low-ball" bid for the minimum shares required to trigger the
rights plan).
3 See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 481 (Del. Ch.
2000) ("[A] poison pill absolutely precludes a hostile acquisition so long as the pill
remains in place .... ); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del.
Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988); see
also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (implicitly con-
cluding that a pill precludes acquisition by stating that "they will not be able to arbi-
trarily reject the offer," and that the board's redemption decision would be subject to
judicial scrutiny under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
4 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 passim (2000) (summarizing studies and sug-
gesting that they ask the wrong question); see also WILLIAM J. CARNY, MERGERS AND
AcQUISITIONs 289-92 (2000) (summarizing studies).
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Fund and Institutional Shareholders Services, have been waged to per-
suade boards to redeem rights plans or make them less powerful.
5
Some have attributed the decline in the number of hostile takeovers
to the widespread adoption of rights plans.
6
John Coates has recently provided trenchant criticism of these
conclusions, as well as a critical reading of the event studies them-
selves. 7 Coates correctly observes that a poison pill is only as good as
the surrounding takeover defenses-primarily those that assure that
the adopting directors have sufficient tenure to make the rights plan
stick-including a staggered board, protection against removal except
for cause, and protections against board-packing by a hostile bidder.
We add the observation that a poison pill is only as good as the
dilution of a bidder that it provides, and that many pills provide sur-
prisingly little. To our knowledge, no one has systematically ex-
amined the operation of rights plans. We do so in this Article. We
conclude that the typical poison pill will make many bidders nause-
ous, but that it will not be fatal in most cases. Under the most plausi-
ble scenario for a typical rights plan, it would add between 6% and
12% to the cost of an acquisition, which is well within typical reserva-
tion prices in hostile takeovers. We explore the reasons for this rela-
tively modest effect, and explain why the present generation of mild
pills has not been swallowed by aggressive bidders.
These plans were created by lawyers, not investment bankers.
They are elaborate contracts that reflect the accumulated wisdom of
experienced corporate lawyers about drafting in the area of converti-
ble securities and options. Their complexity may explain why so little
commentary has appeared about their workings. The event studies
5 For a summary of proxy fights see ISS Study, supra note 1, at 7-10 (Charts 2,
3).
6 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993) ("The takeover wars are over. Man-
agement won .... This remarkable transformation in the market for corporate con-
trol resulted from the emergence of the 'poison pill' as an effective anti-takeover
device, the rapid proliferation of state anti-takeover statutes and the development of
financial market conditions inimical to hostile control contests."); Robert W. Hamil-
ton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25
J. CORP. L. 349, 358 (2000) ("Takeover bids are no longer a major device for eliminat-
ing under-performing management because management has devised effective defen-
sive tactics that make purchase-type takeovers impractical. The principal defensive
weapon today is a 'poison pill ....'); Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of
the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 540, 555 n.54 (1995) ("The reasons for the demise of the
market for corporate control are many. They include the following: . . .(3) the im-
provements in certain anti-takeover mechanisms .....
7 Coates, supra note 4 passim.
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that have examined their impact are virtually devoid of any discussion
of the details of their operation. It is possible that economists are
deterred from this exercise by the legal complexity these plans pre-
sent. We undertake what we believe to be the first close examination
of the operation of rights plans.8
Part I provides a brief explanation of the mechanics of the typical
rights plan. We focus primarily on the "flip-in" feature of rights plans,
which is designed to prevent a bidder from gaining either a significant
toe-hold or actual control of a target.9
In Part II, we examine the impact of the typical rights plan on a
bidder's costs. Our examination reveals that typical rights plans are
less effective than conventional wisdom suggests at deterring hostile
bidders, because the dilution that the bidder suffers has been ex-
amined in a static model that ends with the dilution of the bidder's
initial investment. A dynamic model, in which the bidder completes
the acquisition of the target after suffering dilution, produces quite a
different impression. First, the ability of a rights plan to add to a bid-
der's costs, and thus to the amounts received by target shareholders, is
limited to the amount spent by the bidder in reaching the triggering
ownership level-typically 15% of the target's stock.10 The obvious
intuition is that even total dilution of a bidder holding 15% cannot
add more than 15% to the cost of a takeover-which means that a
conventional rights plan cannot raise the cost of an undervalued tar-
get to an acceptably fair price in many cases. Second, the mechanics
of the typical rights plan mean that the bidder will lose only a fraction,
rather than all, of that initial investment.
In Part III, we explore some variations on the conventional rights
plan that are designed to ameliorate these problems. While these var-
iations can increase the amount of dilution somewhat, they are lim-
ited in effect. These exercises lead to a final conclusion: a poison pill
has all the power of a tablet with a four-hour duration, taken once.
8 Authors of rights plans have provided limited examples of their operation, but
always in a static rather than a dynamic model. We discuss their calculations briefly.
They are consistent with our own first-stage calculations.
9 The "flip-over" feature of rights plans discussed in Part II.B.7, in which rights
become exercisable in a bidder's stock after a merger or similar event, provides no
additional dilution; it is simply an anti-destruction provision that assures the dilutive
effect of rights will continue even if a target corporation disappears in a merger.
10 As we will point out, the bidder's loss is limited to the value of its percentage
ownership in the target; thus, if the market value of the target's shares increases, the
bidder's losses from dilution may exceed the cost of its original investment, but the
percentage of the total value of the target lost from dilution will not change. See
discussion infra Part III.
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Once the pill's effectiveness ends, the illness is free to resume its
course.
In Part IV, we address the obvious objection to our analysis-if
the poison pill is so weak, why hasn't any bidder swallowed one in a
hostile takeover? We show first that the widespread adoption of
poison pills has not diminished acquisition activity, including acquisi-
tions of pill-equipped targets. The move away from hostile tender of-
fers is better explained by a variety of changes in the market, as well as
by the use of proxy fights, stock mergers (favored in current Delaware
law), and management compensation as substitutes for hostile tender
offers.
I. THE OPERATION OF A RIGHTS PLAN
Rights are issued as pro rata distributions to all common stock-
holders. I I The right is typically the right to purchase one unit of a
new series of preferred stock.12 The preferred stock unit has rights
that are essentially equivalent to those of the common stock, with mi-
nor distinctions. 13 These rights are exercisable at the projected "long
term value" of the common stock-the price the stock is predicted to
reach at the end of the ten-year life of the rights-a price typically
three to five times higher than the current market price of the com-
mon stock. 14 To reach these valuations, financial advisers to the
adopting company's board are required to make heroic assumptions
11 The date of the declaration of the dividend of rights is generally called the
"Record Date" or the "Rights Dividend Declaration Date."
12 While there are no legal barriers to using whole shares of preferred stock,
many companies lack sufficient authorized but unissued shares to accomplish this,
and thus use fractions of a share.
13 Each unit has the same dividend and liquidation rights as the common, with
the theoretical difference that the preferred's rights to payment are "prior" to those
of the common, to satisfy what are thought to be legal requirements of a priority of
some kind.
14 See, e.g., MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEovERS & FREEZEOUTS
§ 6.03[4] [b] [i], at 6-62 (2002); Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase
Rights Plan, reprinted in GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, at 58, 62. A recent study of 341
rights plans adopted in 1998 showed median exercise prices were 5.1 times the price
of the common stock at the time of the announcement, but only 3.5 times the high
stock price for the twelve months preceding adoption of the rights plan, suggesting
that declining stock prices may be a primary motivating factor in the adoption of
rights plans. HOULIHAN LoKEY HowARD & ZUKIN, STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN STUDY 4
(1999).
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about growth rates for company profits-typically in excess of 17%
per year, compounded for the ten-year life of the rights plan.
15
These rights are initially "stapled" to the common stock, in the
sense that they can only be transferred with the common stock, and
are not immediately exercisable on issue. 16 The rights separate from
the common stock certificates and rights certificates are issued and
become transferable apart from the common stock on a "Distribution
Date." This occurs when a bidder appears, either by making a tender
offer for a significant block of target shares-typically 30%17-or by
becoming an "Acquiring Person" by acquiring a somewhat smaller
block-typically 15%-on the "Acquisition Date."'18 This makes it
more difficult for a bidder to make a tender offer for a package that
includes both the common stock and the rights because those who
hold rights certificates are no longer necessarily identical with the
shareholders. Prior to the Acquisition Date, the rights are redeem-
able for a nominal amount.1 9
The board's power to redeem the rights for a nominal amount
generally terminates on the Acquisition Date.20 This prevents a bid-
der that has taken a substantial position from waging a proxy fight to
replace the board with new members, who will redeem the rights us-
ing the bidder's newly acquired shares to win the contest.2 1
15 The implied annual growth rate for earnings required to achieve these valua-
tions was 17.7%. HOULIHAN LoKEv HOWARD & ZUKIN, supra note 14, at 4.
16 By the terms of the rights agreement, the rights are initially represented by the
common stock certificates, which contain a notation to this effect.
17 In some plans, the rights separate ten days after the date of first announce-
ment that the bidder either acquires the triggering amount of shares or announces a
tender offer that would result in such ownership. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
supra note 14, at 62.
18 A survey of rights plans adopted in 1998 found thresholds ranging from 10%
to 35%, with a median of 15% and a mean of 16%. HOULIHAN LoKEYv HOWARD &
ZUKIN, supra note 14, at 2. In 1999, the triggers may have been somewhat lower.
More than 75% of the firms adopting or amending rights plans in 1999 set the trigger
at or below 15%, with two-thirds of all adopting firms selecting the 15% level. Pat
McGurn, Poison Pills: The Storm of 1999 Trickles into 2000, INVESTOR REL. Bus., Mar. 20,
2000, at 16. The ISS Study shows that approximately 95 out of 115 plans used a 15%
threshold, while approximately ten set the threshold at 10%. See ISS Study, supra note
1, at 4.
19 McGurn, supra note 18, at 16.
20 Id.
21 It does not prevent a bidder who has not yet reached the triggering amount
from waging such a proxy fight, however, as AT&T did in its fight for control of NCR,
and as Farley Industries did in its successful attempt to take over West Point-Pepperell,
a fabric manufacturer. See CARNEv, supra note 4, at 253. This threat was the inspira-
tion for the "dead hand" pill, which attempted to protect the tenure of incumbent
directors who were not otherwise protected by provisions for a staggered board, re-
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More importantly, at the Acquisition Date, the rights are no
longer exercisable to acquire a preferred stock unit at an unrealistic
price-it was never contemplated that the preferred stock rights
would be exercised on their original terms.2 2 In the event the bidder
acquires a specified substantial block and becomes an "Acquiring Per-
son," the rights "flip in" and become exercisable for the target's com-
mon stock (the "flip-in") at a discount, typically 50% of current
market value.23 The exercise price for the preferred becomes the ex-
ercise price for multiple shares of common stock. Thus, if the exer-
cise price was $100 per unit of preferred, the holder right now has the
right to purchase common stock with a market value (pre-Acquisition
Date) of $200 for $100.24 The key to the operation of this plan is
discrimination against the bidder-rights are void in the bidder's
hands.
moval only for cause, and prohibitions against board-packing. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon,
'Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Dead Hand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay
for Warren Buffet, 19 CARnozo L. REv. 511, 531-32 (1997).
22 The Internal Revenue Service has concluded that the probability of exercise of
these rights is so remote that the distribution of the rights as a dividend does not
constitute the distribution of stock or property to shareholders, and thus has no tax
consequences. Shareholders do not realize any taxable income on the receipt of
rights. Rev. Rul. 90-11, 1990-1 C.B. 10, 11.
23 Thus the holder of a right would obtain the right to purchase $200 worth of
target common stock at an exercise price of $100. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra
note 14, at 6-62; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 14, at 62.
24 Because companies may lack sufficient authorized but unissued shares of com-
mon stock to honor the rights, some plans now provide for a flip-in to be exercisable
in "common stock equivalents," which are generally preferred share units with terms
comparable to common stock. See, e.g., BRYAN, supra note 1, § 3-2 (describing the
rights agreement of Bowen Companies, Inc.). The number of preferred units is in-
creased, so the exercise obtains for the rights-holder a number of units equal to the
number of shares of common stock that two times the exercise price could acquire.
Because "blank check" preferred shares can be divided by the board into as many
units as the board determines, and because these preferred units are the economic
equivalent of the common stock, there is no limit to the number of shares that can be
issued on exercise of the rights. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, at 75-76 (§11 (a)
of the Rights Plan). Another solution provided by many rights plans is to allow the
board to exchange the rights for one share of common stock. This avoids forcing
shareholders to pay cash to exercise the rights. The difficulty, as we will show, is that
the smaller number of dilutive shares issued reduces the dilution of the bidder's in-
vestment. See infra Table 5. Finally, many rights plans provide that in the event the
issuer lacks sufficient shares to honor all the rights, it will be obligated to pay rights-
holders "damages"-the difference between the value of what they actually receive on
exercise and the value of that to which they were entitled. To avoid insolvency issues,
these obligations are generally conditioned on the availability of sufficient cash, and
create a continuing obligation to pay cash as it becomes legally available for payment.
2003]
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These rights have an important anti-destruction provision-a
merger of the target into the bidder does not destroy the rights. In-
stead they "flip over" to become exercisable in the bidder's common
stock, on the same bargain basis as the flip-in rights-a 50% discount,
using the same exercise price. Thus, the dilution of the bidder's
shareholders is identical, whether the flip-in or flip-over rights are
triggered.
25
II. THE IMPACT OF A RIGHTS PLAN
A. Introductory Problems
We now examine how a rights plan would operate if triggered.
We begin with a simple observation: a rights plan can only dilute the
investment that a bidder has already made when it crosses the thresh-
old that triggers the rights. If the threshold is 15%, that is the most
that can be taken from a bidder through dilution, hardly enough to
deter a determined bidder prepared to pay a premium for a target it
perceives to be undervalued. Because most rights plans only provide a
50% discount from market price, they will not appropriate all of the
bidder's initial investment.
One of the difficulties in examining the operation of rights plans
is that none have operated. In the 1980s, Sir James Goldsmith ac-
quired a sufficient amount of the stock of Crown Zellerbach Corpora-
tion to make its flip-over rights non-redeemable, but did not engage
in a self-dealing event, such as a takeout merger, that allowed exercise
of the flip-over rights. 26 No flip-in plan has ever been deliberately trig-
gered,2 7 although the authors experienced a close call in one case,
and there have been a few other apparently inadvertent triggering
events. 28 Several uncertainties present themselves in assessing the im-
25 See infra Part II.B.7. Both the flip-in and flip-over rights have antidilution pro-
tection for rights holders of the type commonly found in convertible securities and
options.
26 See CARNEY, supra note 4, at 264. The earliest rights plans lacked a flip-in fea-
ture; they only operated if the bidder engaged in a merger or other business combina-
tion with the target. Id.
27 See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE
§ 5.02[A], at 5-18 to 5-19 (6th ed. 2002).
28 In our case, the investor that crossed the triggering threshold also failed to file
a timely Schedule 13D, so there was no public announcement of the acquisition of
the amount that would have made the investor an "Acquiring Person," which allowed
for a settlement. One issuer that experienced inadvertent triggering events is Pedia-
trix Medical Group. Michele Chandler, Shareholder Nearly Triggers a Poison Pill at Ailing
Pediatrix, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 21, 1999, at 3C; see also Business Briefs, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Mar. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 17761404 (Worldtex, Inc.); David Iva-
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pact of a rights plan. If the rights plan flips in, will rights-holders exer-
cise immediately or will they wait until immediately before expiration,
as rational holders of conventional options would do? While shares
should be valued on a fully diluted basis in efficient markets, uncer-
tainty about the target's receipt of cash and its investment or disposi-
tion by the target could influence the market value of its stock after
the flip-in, and thus the cost of acquisition. We discuss this issue in
Parts II.B.2 and II.B.6.
Because of the lack of operational experience, several other ques-
tions cannot be answered definitively. What will a target do with pro-
ceeds received from the exercise of the rights? If rights are exercised,
the target will receive cash representing a multiple of the aggregate
market value of its current equity, and will be unlikely to have any
massive positive net present value projects in which to invest. In es-
sence, it will probably hold cash or equivalents. If the proceeds are
simply held by the target, the bidder can recapture them upon ob-
taining 100% control. If they are distributed to other shareholders in
a discriminatory manner, the bidder's dilution losses are increased.
We explore this in Part II.B.6. Similarly, what if rights are not exer-
cised immediately, but are only exercised after the bidder has in-
creased its ownership beyond the minimum amount required to
trigger the rights? The obvious answer is that the bidder has a larger
investment subject to dilution, and thus larger losses. This is also ex-
plored in Part II.B.6.
B. Calculating Bidder Dilution
We begin our discussion of bidder dilution with a caution: it is
only half the picture. Too often analysis stops with an observation that
a hostile bidder's initial investment will be massively diluted by cross-
ing the threshold that permits exercise of the flip-in rights. While this
is true, it gives an incomplete picture of the costs imposed by a rights
novich, BJ Services Swallows Poison Pill: Takeover Defense Set Off by Mistake, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 7, 1994, at ID (BJ Services); News Digest, RUBBER & PLASTICS NEWS, July
24, 2000, at 4 (Newcor Inc.); Al Stamborski, Rawlings and 2 Investors Avoid Triggering
Poison Pill, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, May 7, 1999, at ClI (Rawlings Sporting Goods
Co. Inc.); Craig Woker, Illinois Bank Sweeps Legal Doubleheader, AM. BANKER, Mar. 3,
2000, at 5. Harold Simmons did trigger separation of a flip-in, flip-over plan of NL
Industries in the 1980s by acquiring 20% of its shares, but the flip-in rights did not
become exercisable until the occurrence of a business combination or the bidder's
increase in its holdings by more than 1%. See Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus.,
644 F. Supp. 1229,1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Newell Co. announced that it would swallow
a poison pill of Win. E. Wright Co., but there is no indication whether it was a flip-in
pill. Newell to Swallow "Poison Pill," CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1985, § 4, at 3.
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plan on a determined bidder; it is a static rather than a dynamic analy-
sis. As we noted earlier, the typical rights plan's flip-in rights are trig-
gered by a 15% acquisition. If a bidder's initial investment is totally
destroyed by the exercise of the rights, the rights plan has added only
15% to the bidder's costs of a total acquisition. Dilution is never
100% because the bidder remains the owner of some diminished per-
centage of the outstanding shares, so the bidder's actual losses (added
costs) will be somewhat less.
29
We begin our analysis by examining the operation of a typical
preferred stock rights plan, with flip-in rights triggered at the 15%
level, and with the rights exercisable at a 50% discount from market
price. We assume that rights have been issued at an exercise price
four times the current (pre-bid) market price of the common stock.
We further assume immediate exercise of the rights, and receipt of
the proceeds by the target. We will then show that triggering flip-in
rights at the minimum ownership level is a dominant strategy, because
triggering with the bidder owning larger amounts always puts more of
the bidder's investment at risk-at least until unrealistically high levels
of ownership are attained. Table 1 below sets out the assumptions in
our examples:
TABLE 1. ASSUMPTIONS FOR A TYPicAL PREFERRED STOCK RIGHTS PLAN
1. Target shares outstanding: 1,000,000
2. Pre-bid market price per share: $10.00
3. Bidder's per share cost for the first 15%: $15.0030
4. Expected takeover bid price per share: $15.00
5. Exercise price for preferred stock rights: $40.00
6. Assumed market value per share of target shares for
calculating common stock acquisition price: $15.00
7. Flip-in trigger: 15%
8. Flip-in discount: 50%
9. Shares issuable per right if the market price is $15
($80 / 15): 5.3333333
29 It is impossible for a rights plan to destroy the bidder's entire investment be-
cause whatever the percentage, the bidder retains some shares in the target.
30 This is a simplifying assumption; it is likely that the bidder's average cost per
share for the first 15% will be less than $15 per share. The differences in results are
modest, however. See infra Part II.B.4.
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1. The Operation of a Flip-In Rights Plan
We now assume that a bidder acquires the minimum amount of
shares necessary to trigger the rights, so that shares now trade on a
fully diluted basis. Because the bidder receives no rights and suffers
dilution, its percentage ownership is severely diluted, from 15% to
2.7%. But, unlike prior examples, we assume that the bidder is deter-
mined, and that it then proceeds to acquire the remaining public
shares at the takeover premium of 50% over the pre-bid value of the
target.
Table 2 shows the bidder's costs of a complete acquisition using
these assumptions:
TABLE 2. BIDDER'S COST OF ACQUISITION USING A MINIMUM
PURCHASE WITH A PREFERRED STOCK RIGHTS PLAN
Bidder's initial acquisition of 150,000 shares at
$15.00: $2,250,000





Proceeds of exercise (850, 000 x $40) - $34,000,000
Market's estimate target value: $49,000,000
Value per fully diluted share
($49,000,000 / 5,533,333) = $8.855421
Value of bidder's 150,000 shares: $1,328,313
Bidder's dilution losses: $921,688
Bidder's costs for remaining shares
(5,383,333 x $8.855422) = $47,671,688
Total Cost to Bidder: $49,921,688
If we assume that the proceeds from exercising the rights have
been retained intact by the target, once the bidder has gained control
it can capture the $34,000,000 proceeds. This leaves a net cost of
$15,921,688. The dilution loss, $921,688, represents 41% of the bid-
der's initial investment. 31 Put another and more dynamic way, it rep-
resents 9.2% of the target's pre-bid value, or 6.1% of the bidder's
original estimate of the cost of an acquisition, absent the rights plan.
Premiums of this general magnitude are supported by studies of the
31 If the target immediately dividended the proceeds, before the bidder com-
pleted the acquisition, the bidder would receive a small portion (2.71%) of the
$34,000,000 dividend. This would amount to $921,400, virtually eliminating the dilu-
tion of the bidder's investment (but not ownership percentage) previously suffered.
See discussion infra Part II.B.6.
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premiums added to the cost of acquisitions by the presence of rights
plans.
3 2
The expected cost of a rights plan to a bidder is the bidder's cost
per share times the number of shares held by the bidder, minus the
post-issue (fully diluted) market value of the target's shares held by
the bidder, which is a function of the market value of the entire com-
pany divided by the post-issue number of target shares. This can be
expressed as equation (1):
L = ca - (mx + p) (a)
x+ d
where L = bidder's loss through dilution; c = bidder's average pre-
trigger cost per share; m = pre-trigger market price; a = bidder's share
ownership at the time flip-in rights are triggered; x = shares outstand-
ing before dilutive issuance; d = number of shares issued in dilutive
distribution; p = proceeds from exercise of rights (x-a)e; and e = exer-
cise price of rights.
Equation (1) expresses the obvious truth that the bidder's loss
can be no more than the bidder's investment in the target (ma) at the
time the rights become exercisable, ameliorated by the new value re-
ceived upon exercise of the rights (p), and limited by the fact that the
32 According to a study of premiums obtained between 1992 and 1996, the pres-
ence of a rights plan increased premiums by almost 8% of finn value. GEORGESON
S'HOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: POISON PILLS AND SHARE-
HOLDER VALUE 1992-1996, at 1 (1997), available at http://www.georgeson.com/pdf/
M&Apoisonpill.pdf. An earlier study found bid improvements of 14% for targets with
pills that were subsequently taken over. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM'N, THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLD-
ERS 41 (1986). This study examines early versions of rights plans in a small sample,
given the date of the study. A Morgan Stanley study of deals between 1988 and 1995
reported gains to firms with pills of approximately 16%. Mark S. Porter, Poison Pills
Add Premium to Deal Pricing, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REP., Aug. 4, 1997, at 2; see also
John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?,
54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 783, 794 n.44 (2000). Coates notes an update that produced
similar results. Id. at 795 n.45 (citing Kenneth A. Bertsch, Poison Pills, in INVESTOR
RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERIES 1998 BACKGROUND
REPORT E, at 21 (June 25, 1998)); see also Comment & Schwert, supra note 1, at 30-31
(finding premium increases in this range). These percentage gains are higher than
the dilution inflicted by our model. This may be a result of the issuance of more
shares than our model suggests. A J.P. Morgan study of acquisitions since 1997
showed a median premium for firms with pills of 35.9% vs. 31.9% for firms without
pills. Emily Thornton et al., The Bids Sure Are Getting Hostile, Bus. WK. ONLINE,Jan. 4,
2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/magizine/content/02-02/b2765083.htm.
See infra Table 3 (demonstrating how increasing the number of shares issued can
increase bidder dilution).
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bidder will retain some percentage ownership in the firm absent issu-
ance of an infinite number of new shares at a zero-exercise price.
2. The Effect on Other Shareholders
We pause here to discuss the incentives of rights holders to exer-
cise. We can only speculate about the probabilities of immediate exer-
cise of these rights, but we believe the probability is high. Typical
stock options have an exercise price at or above the current market
value of the stock when issued, and thus there is typically no incentive
to exercise immediately, because the stock can be obtained in the
market at a lower price at the time of option issuance. Further, ra-
tional holders will not exercise until the end of the option period,
when they can determine whether exercise remains beneficial.
In contrast, there is no good economic reason for shareholders to
delay the exercise of rights once triggered. Unlike conventional op-
tions, preferred stock poison pill rights are not rights to purchase a
specified number of shares at a specified price. Virtually all of the
preferred stock plans employ a formula for the flip-in rights: whatever
the exercise price, it is the right to buy shares with a market value
double the exercise price at the date the rights become exercisable in
the target's common stock.33 If the exercise price is $40, the market
value of shares to be purchased is $80 as determined on date of ex-
ercisability. Thus, in contrast to conventional options, it is the num-
ber of shares, rather than the profit from exercise, that will vary with
the price of the underlying common stock.
Because shareholders (other than the bidder) can gain immedi-
ately from the exercise of the flip-in rights, regardless of the stock's
current price, and because the size of the profit on exercise will be
33 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 14, at H-23 (reprinting § 11 (a)(ii) of the
Rights Agreement). The 1999 rights plan of Mellon Bank contains the following lan-
guage concerning the flip-in from the right to purchase a unit of preferred stock to
the right to purchase common stock:
3.1 Flip-in. (a) In the event that prior to the Expiration Time a Flip-in Date
shall occur, except as provided in this Section 3.1, each Right shall constitute
the right to purchase from the Company, upon exercise thereof in accor-
dance with the terms hereof (but subject to Section 5.10), that number of
shares of Common Stock having an aggregate Market Price on the Stock
Acquisition Date equal to twice the Exercise Price for an amount of cash
equal to the Exercise Price (such right to be appropriately adjusted in order
to protect the interests of the holders of Rights generally in the event that on
or after such Stock Acquisition Date an event of a type analogous to any of
the events described in Section 2.4(a) or (b) shall have occurred with re-
spect to the Common Stock).
BRYAN, supra note 1, § 3-27.
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constant, we assume immediate exercise in the examples below. This
is particularly likely in the context of a hostile takeover battle, where
arbitrageurs will want to be able either to tender shares to the bid-
der3 4 or dispose of their shares (including those subject to flip-in
rights) as soon as possible after a bid fails. This is a risk-free arbitrage
opportunity, which should assure that a high percentage of rights are
promptly exercised. On the other hand, individual shareholders may
not be so quick to exercise flip-in rights because of transaction costs in
raising funds to exercise, a reluctance (even short-term) to put so
many eggs in one basket, or simple inertia.35 Nevertheless, the dilu-
tive effects remain similar regardless of the time of exercise.
Simply put, the profits from exercise are the pro rata share of the
bidder's dilution losses, assuming all holders exercise. Thus, if the
bidder's losses are $921,688, this sum is divided among the 850,000
remaining shares to produce a gain from exercise of $1.084 per share.
This can be expressed as equation (2):
G = mx + p - e- (d) - (m - (Mx + p))
x+d x-a x+d
In our example in Table 2, the $40 exercise price produces 5.33
shares per right, at a cost of $7.50 per share. On a fully diluted basis,
the post-exercise shares are worth $8.855422. The gains from exercise
are $8.855422 - $7.50 x 5.33 = $7.22, minus the loss on the original
$15.00 share held, which is $6.144578. Thus, the net gain is $7.22 -
$6.144578 = $1.084339. While this gain is not huge, the alternative
for a shareholder who chooses to hold his rights and not exercise is a
loss of $6.144578 per share, so the difference between exercising and
not exercising is $7.2289-enough to make this an offer a shareholder
cannot refuse. The shareholder who chooses not to exercise will be
able to sell her rights for a price close to $7.22, and avoid a commit-
ment to invest more in the company.
3. The Impact on the Percentage of the Bid Premium
Our discussion thus far has not considered the reduction in the
magnitude of the bid premium as a percentage of the target's fully
diluted stock price. If, using the example in Table 2, the proceeds
from the exercise of the rights are $34,000,000, the total value of the
target, excluding the takeover premium, will be approximately
34 Because the rights will not be exercisable by the bidder, the arbitrageurs can
be expected to exercise and then tender all of the shares they own.
35 Because the rights are transferable after the Distribution Date, reluctant share-
holders should be able to sell these rights in the market.
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$44,000,000. If the bidder persists in offering a premium of $5 mil-
lion for the entire company, the premium is now only approximately
11.3% of target value witliout a control premium. Whether this dra-
matic percentage reduction in the bid premium is sufficient to defeat
a bid depends on whether the bidder can convince the remaining
shareholders that the premium for the target's core business assets is
still 50% over the pre-bid market price of the target, and that no pre-
mium will ever be paid for that portion of the target represented by
the proceeds from exercise. In short, the cash received is worth just
what it is (at best), and target management cannot be expected to use
such huge amounts in positive net present value projects.
4. The Impact of a Creeping Tender Offer
We now introduce a second complication. We relax our assump-
tion of a single price for the target's shares throughout a takeover.
We have thus far assumed that the bidder paid the full takeover pre-
mium for all shares acquired, which maximizes the bidder's invest-
ment available for dilution. In most cases, the bidder will quietly
acquire shares in the market in a "creeping tender offer," at a price
the bidder hopes will not be influenced by any signal of an impending
takeover. We assume, for purposes of our example, that the bidder is
able to acquire 10% of the target's shares at a price uninfluenced by
the signal, and that at this point the bidder files its Schedule 13D re-
vealing its intent to take control, so that additional purchases will re-
flect the full takeover premium. 36 The effect of this is to reduce the
bidder's initial investment below the amount stated in equations (1)
and (2) and in Table 1, in our examples by $500,000. This weakens
the dilutive power of a rights plan.
3 7
5. Bidders' Dominant Strategies
Courts and commentators have mentioned the possibility that a
rights plan could be defeated through a tender offer for a high mini-
mum number of shares and rights, so that fewer rights would remain
36 We ignore for our calculations the inhibiting effect of section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)-(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003), provid-
ing that if a holder of more than 10% of a class of equity security engages in
purchases and sales within six months, any profits inure to the target.
37 Reducing the bidder's investment by $500,000 would reduce the bidder's dilu-
tion losses to $421,686.85, or 4.2% of the pre-bid market value of the target. The
bidder's loss on its initial 100,000 shares is $1.144579 per share ($114,457.90), while
its loss on the remaining 50,000 shares is $6.144579 per share ($307,228.95).
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outstanding to create dilution.38 At the same time, the bidder's invest-
ment that is subject to dilution is much larger, and it is this effect that
dominates over a very broad range. Table 3 demonstrates this effect
at very high levels of ownership-levels that are unrealistic goals for a
hostile tender offer. In all other respects the assumptions of Table 1
continue to apply.
TABLE 3. BIDDER'S DILUTION WHEN SHARES ARE ISSUED AT HIGHER
LEVELS OF BIDDER OWNERSHIP
Bidder's Bidder's Percent









98% $ 708,349 4.8%
In absolute dollar losses through dilution, the bidder would have
to acquire 98% of all target shares in order to reduce dilution losses
below those imposed by simply acquiring the minimum amount of
15% required to trigger the rights. The first lesson for bidders, then,
is to minimize the investment made to trigger the rights. Courts that
have viewed a high minimum ownership condition for a tender offer
as a way around the rights have simply failed to do any calculations.3
9
38 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) ("The evi-
dence at trial also evidenced many methods around the Plan ranging from tendering
with a condition that the Board redeem the Rights, tendering with a high minimum
condition of shares and Rights. . . ."); see also Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652
F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn. 1986) (citing Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354); Richard A.
Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 707, 729 (1989)
("Faced with such a poison pill, the bidder would need to acquire between 85% and
90% of the target's stock.., to be completely assured of control of the company.... a
poison pill will not block a takeover if the bidder is willing to buy a large enough
percentage of target shares."); Martin M. Cohen, Note, "Poison Pills" as a Negotiating
Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 459,
464 n.21.
39 One judicial opinion contains a hint of a calculation. In Amalgamated Sugar Co.
v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),Judge Broderick suggested that
it would take an unrealistically high percentage of ownership to avoid serious dilu-
tion-in the range of 95%.
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6. Variations
Here we relax two assumptions in the model presented above
that could affect our results. One involves issuer repurchases of
shares with the proceeds of the exercise of rights so the bidder cannot
recapture all of the proceeds. The second involves the development
of a trading market in rights certificates so the bidder cannot effec-
tively tender for shares with rights attached.
There is no reason to expect the target to have any positive net
present value projects in which to invest the proceeds of the exercise
of rights when received. The proceeds will be several times the cur-
rent equity of the firm, because the exercise price has been set at a
multiple of the value of the common stock at the record date. Any
funds received can, in all likelihood, only be invested by the target in
negative net present value projects. A prompt distribution to share-
holders during a takeover seems more likely. Such a distribution
would probably be discriminatory, excluding the bidder, in the form
of a self-tender or market repurchases intended to drive the market
price above the bid price. 40 Nevertheless, our previous calculations
assumed that the proceeds added to the value of the target on a dol-
lar-for- dollar basis. Distributions to shareholders, if made in the form
of a Unocaltype selective stock repurchase, 41 would increase the bid-
der's dilution losses by the bidder's pro rata share of the repurchase
expenditure, post dilution, which, in the example given in Table 2, is
2.7%. Thus, if $20,000,000 were spent on stock repurchases, this
would add another $542,168 to the bidder's cost of acquisition and
dilution losses, as shown in Table 2. Total losses would then rise to
$1,463,856, representing 14.6% of the target's pre-bid value, or 9.7%
of the bidder's estimate of the cost of acquisition absent a rights plan.
If, in the most extreme case, the target employed the entire
$34,000,000 proceeds to repurchase shares, the bidder's losses in ex-
cess of Table 2 would rise to $918,000. Total losses would rise to
$1,839,688, or 18.4% of the target's pre-bid value, or 12.3% of the
bidder's anticipated cost absent a rights plan. While dramatic as a
40 In the 1980s, these distributions frequently emulated the strategies of finan-
cially motivated bidders' leveraged takeover bids. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
41 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958 (approving a self-tender offer that excluded the
bidder).
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percentage of the bidder's original $2.25 million investment (81.7%),
this added cost is unlikely to be prohibitive in many acquisitions.
The second variation is more problematic for bidders. Our previ-
ous examples have assumed immediate exercise of the rights. But
shareholders might not exercise immediately, even to obtain the cer-
tain wealth transfer achievable with exercise. Thus, the bidder's ac-
quisition of the amount required to trigger exercise, 15% in our
example, might not result in the prompt issuance of the additional
shares shown in Table 2. If the bidder wishes to acquire control of the
target by owning 50% plus one share, in the face of non-exercise of
the rights, the amount the bidder places at risk of dilution increases,
similar to the manner shown in Table 3, but with a larger number of
rights subject to dilutive exercise.
If a bidder acquired shares in excess of the triggering amount, say
enough to gain control (50% plus 1), dilution would increase. Equa-
tion (1) would be applied so that a would represent the amount held
by the bidder at the time rights were exercised, rather than at the time
they were triggered. If the bidder acquired 50% of the outstanding
shares, the equation would read as follows:
L = $7,500,000- (49,000,000) (500,000) = $4,427,711
5,533,333
While this would wipe out most of the $5 million premium the
bidder was prepared to pay, it seems unrealistic, because the bidder
would decline to accept tendered shares unless accompanied by the
rights, except at a discount representing their fully diluted value. One
alternative for the bidder, once having acquired the triggering
amount, is to acquire rights in the market for $7.2289 and offer the
fully diluted value of the shares, $8.855421 for a total per share of
$16.084321. If the bidder acquires one right for each share acquired,
the total cost of acquiring the remaining 85% of the shares is in-
creased by $921,672 ($1.084 x 850,000). Except for a $16 rounding
error, this is the same cost as shown in Table 2. To the extent the
bidder cannot match rights with shares, expected costs to the bidder
rise.
7. Post-Script: The Flip-Over Feature
Thus far we have focused exclusively on the impact of a rights
plan on the first stage in a hostile takeover-the acquisition of a con-
trolling interest but less than all of the shares of the target. The sec-
ond stage-the "takeout merger"-is restricted by the "flip-over"
feature of rights plans. This feature makes unexercised rights exercis-
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able in the bidder's stock on the same bargain basis as the flip-in
rights previously provided, and thus protects them from destruction
through a merger or other business combination if the target disap-
pears. Rights plans provide a fixed profit for the rights holder upon
exercise. The analysis does not change in the event of a merger in
which the rights flip over. Using our example in Table 1, the rights
simply become exercisable for $80 worth of bidder stock rather than
target stock.
III. CAN RIGHTS PLANs BE MADE MoRE EFFECTIVE?
We now explore possible alterations in preferred stock rights
plans designed to give them more dilutive power. These changes have
been employed in a number of rights plans, but again, no formal anal-
ysis has yet been offered. While some of these changes are marketed
as making rights plans more powerful, all are limited by the size of the
bidder's initial investment.
A. Reducing the Exercise Price
In this section, we show that dilution of the bidder can be
doubled simply by reducing the exercise price from the conventional
50% of market value to zero. While a zero exercise price, equivalent
to a discriminatory dividend, may create problems from a legal capital
perspective, it demonstrates the limits of the typical rights plan. Be-
cause of the difficulties with a zero exercise price (in effect a discrimi-
natory stock dividend), we show the impact on dilution of various
exercise prices greater than zero. If the exercise price were zero,
equation (1) would be modified by eliminating p, as follows:
L = ma- (mx) (a)
x+d
Table 4 shows increasing levels of dilution as the exercise price
declines. It also demonstrates that even zero price plans have only a
modest impact on the power of a rights plan to deter bidders.
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TABLE 4. BIDDER'S DILUTION AT VARYING DISCOUNTS
4 2
Discount from Bidder's Percent Percent Added
Market Price Dilution Losses Investment Lost to Cost
50% $ 921,688 41% 6%
60% $1,106,024 49% 7%
70% $1,290,361 57% 9%
80% $1,474,699 66% 10%
90% $1,659,036 74% 11%
100% $1,843,373 82% 12%
Thus, in our minimum acquisition example, the bidder's losses
through dilution are doubled as a percentage of the initial investment
if the rights are exercisable at a 100% discount, compared to the dom-
inant model. 43 This represents approximately 18% of the pre-bid
value of the target-hardly an insuperable barrier to typical bids,
where premia have averaged 50% or more in hostile bids. 44 While
free shares are obviously the strongest deterrent, such large distribu-
tions would likely be treated as stock dividends, which would pose sev-
eral legal problems. First, such a dividend would be discriminatory,
and while there is precedent for discriminatory treatment of bid-
ders,45 each variation creates new uncertainties. 46 Second, in many
jurisdictions, a stock dividend would require assignment of surplus,
42 The bidder's original estimated cost based on $15 per share. The percentages
are rounded.
43 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz employ an example that reveals bidder dilu-
tion of 43.2%. The slight variation from the 41% shown above is a function of a 20%
triggering threshold and a different relation between current market prices and the
exercise price of the rights. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 14, at 64-65.
44 Kraakman, supra note 2, at 908.
45 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory
rights plan); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (discrimi-
natory repurchase); Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 1979 WL 2710 (Del. Ch. June 21,
1979) (discriminatory voting rules), afftd, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
46 Prior to amendments of the relevant statutes, a number of courts in jurisdic-
tions other than Delaware had voided rights plans as discriminatory. See, e.g., W.
Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (applying
Georgia law); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (applying New Jersey law); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp.
1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New Jersey law to a "poison put" fights plan); see also
Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.NJ. 1985) (voiding discriminatory voting
plan under New Jersey law). Delaware has held that discriminatory stock issues are
invalid under some circumstances. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769,
776 (Del. Ch. 1967). But see Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 1979 WL 2710 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 1979) (holding that discriminatory voting rules are not invalid), aff'd, 414
A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
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which may not be available in the huge amounts necessary for a divi-
dend of this size.
47
The conclusion must be that rights exercisable at 50% of market
value remove much of the power of a rights plan. The lower the exer-
cise price, the greater the power of the rights plan. But rights plans
with little or no exercise price are not generally observed. Even if they
were, they could not take more than the bidder has invested.
B. Varying the Number of Shares Issuable Per Right
In this section we ask what happens if more or fewer shares are
issuable per right. Typically this effect can be obtained by increasing
the original exercise price as a percentage of the market value of tar-
get shares. We have calculated this plan's effects on a bidder's dilu-
tion at various levels, beginning with one share per right. This
calculation has relevance because many rights plans permit the target
(in the absence of sufficient authorized but unissued shares to fully
honor the rights) to exchange the rights for one share per right. If,
for example, rights are honored by the issuance of a single share per
right for no consideration, the bidder's dilution loss is $1,033,784, or
46% of its $2,250,000 investment. Table 5 shows the bidder's losses
through dilution at various levels of share issuance to the holders of
the remaining 850,000 shares, assuming a purchase at 50% of market
value. These calculations should be compared with the effective rate
shown in previous examples, which was 5.333 shares per right, given
the assumptions about market prices. All other assumptions remain
unchanged from those used in Table 1.
47 To the extent that shares are distributed to shareholders without considera-
tion, this will be treated as a dividend, payable in many jurisdictions only from sur-
plus. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 173 (2001); see also N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 703.02(A) (1998) (requiring assignment of retained earnings
equal to the market value of the shares to permanent capital). Accounting standards
impose similar requirements. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RE-
SEARCH BULL. No. 43, at 49-54 (1953).
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TABLE 5. BIDDER'S DILUTION WrITH VARYING LEVELS OF SHARES ISSUED
PER RIGHT-SHARES ISSUED AT THRESHOLD TRIGGER LEVEL
Number of Shares Bidder's Percent
Issued per Right Dilution Losses Investment Lost






Rights plans typically have a ten-year life, and many are not
amended or updated during that term. But if the target's stock price
rises during this period, it can seriously diminish the dilutive impact
of the rights. The typical plan permits exercise at a price that is three
to five times the current market price of the target's shares at the time
of adoption. But if the market price of the target's shares doubles
during the life of the rights, the exercise price may drop to two-times
the current market value of the target's shares or less. Thus, using the
numbers in Table 5, if the market price rises from $10 to $20, an
exercise at $40 produces four shares of common stock rather than the
original eight, and significantly less dilution. Further, the bidder's di-
lution declines as a percentage of the total value of the target.
C. Raising the Flip-In Threshold
The increments to a bidder's cost added by a rights plan appear
quite modest in our examples. Our polar examples, however, may
have failed to capture some increases in these costs that are possible.
What happens if the flip-in rights become exercisable at points in be-
tween 15% and 90% ownership? Table 3 contains some interim posi-
tions-flip-in rights set at thresholds of 20-50%-that demonstrate
that meaningful dilution can be obtained by raising the threshold for
the exercise of these rights.
The difficulty with a higher threshold for the exercise of flip-in
rights is that it allows bidders to obtain a more substantial ownership
position without fear of dilution. This can block a future negotiated
transaction with a third party, as well as form a strong base for proxy
fights.
One possible solution to this problem is to set the ownership level
at one level for the separation of the rights from the common stock
and the termination of the board's power to redeem, and at another
level for triggering flip-in rights. Thus, rights could separate at the
15% level, and become exercisable in common stock at the 40% or
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50% level.48 A bidder would hesitate to move past the first threshold
because the board's power to redeem the rights would terminate, and
the bidder would be unable either to negotiate a friendly transaction
or effect a change in the board that would allow redemption of the
rights. There are several legal problems with this strategy that would
preclude its effective use in some jurisdictions. If a hostile bidder
moves through the first threshold, thus making the rights non-re-
deemable, the board may be locked into a position where it cannot
redeem the rights or effectively negotiate with certain other bidders
for the balance of the ten-year life of the rights plan. This was the
essence of the rights plan of NL Industries (NLI) that was successfully
challenged by Harold Simmons under New Jersey law.49 Recent Dela-
ware decisions concerning "dead hand" and "slow hand" rights plans
that limit or preclude boards from redeeming rights also raise troub-
ling questions about the viability of this strategy to the extent that it
prevents a board from redeeming rights. 50
D. Common Stock Rights Plans
As Table 5 demonstrated, if the exercise price is fixed in advance,
increases in market value of shares will erode the number of dilutive
shares that can be issued. In order to cure this problem, one could
abandon the conventional preferred stock rights plan as unduly com-
plex and as contributing nothing to the dilutive effect of rights, and
simply issue rights to purchase common stock. To ensure continuing
dilutive power, in the following example we simply specify the number
of common shares per right that can be purchased, and specify a per-
centage discount from the market price of the shares as the exercise
price. We eliminate the unnecessary step of having rights first exercis-
48 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 54, 60 n.26 (describing rights plan of Federated Department Stores, which pro-
vides that rights separate when an Acquiring Person owns 20%, and the flip-in be-
comes exercisable when the Acquiring Person acquires 50% or more of Federated's
stock).
49 Amalgamated Sugar Co., 644 F. Supp. at 1232, 1238. Here, the rights separated
and became non-redeemable at the 20% level and exercisable at the 21% level. The
court condemned this structure: "In structuring the rights plan, the board of direc-
tors, advisedly or otherwise, abdicated future control or responsibility with respect to
tender offers by simply making them impossible." Id. at 1239.
50 See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998)
(rejecting a "slow hand" rights plan that precluded redemption by a newly elected
board for six months on the ground that Delaware law did not permit limitations on
directors' power except in the charter); see also Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d
1180-(Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating a "dead hand" rights plan that completely pre-
cluded a newly elected board from redeeming the rights on similar grounds).
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able in preferred stock and simply provide the right to purchase com-
mon stock.
For purposes of our illustration we use ten shares of common
stock per right. Additionally, we use an exercise price of 20% of mar-
ket value. In our calculations below we use a market price of $15.00
when the rights become exercisable, which leads to an exercise price
of $3.00 per share, for proceeds of $30.51
To be absolutely certain that no bidder seeks to reduce the im-
pact of dilution by acquiring virtually all shares, we employ a formula
that increases the number of shares to be purchased (N) as the bidder




Where r = the number of target shares for which a right is initially
exercisable.
This formula increases the total dilution the bidder suffers in the
unlikely event of a maximum purchase (increases in dilution over the
preferred stock plan are modest for minimum acquisitions at lower
percentages). For example, if the rights are initially exercisable to
purchase 10 shares, once the bidder owns 15% of the target's shares,
the plan would provide that each right is exercisable for:
R = 10( 1,000,000 )= 11.764 shares per right
1,000,000-150,000
Use of this formula has the effect of increasing the number of
shares that can be purchased by the remaining public shareholders as
the bidder's ownership increases. This formula holds the number of
shares to be issued for the rights constant regardless of the bidder's
percentage of ownership. Because, in our example, the rights would
be based on the issuance of ten times as many shares as are currently
outstanding, exercise of the rights would always put the bidder back
below 10% on a fully diluted basis. In our example, the rights would
always be exercisable for 10,000,000 shares, regardless of the number
of rights outstanding in the hands of the public shareholders. This
can be demonstrated by assuming acquisition of 95% of all shares by
the bidder:
51 The rights exercise price would be set once the rights are exercisable, and the
target would announce the exercise price when the rights separate and rights certifi-
cates are issued.
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R = 10( 1,000,000 )= 200 shares per right
1,000,000-950,000
With 11,000,000 fully diluted shares outstanding, the bidder's
ownership is reduced to 8.6%. In effect, the bidder would have to
restart its acquisition effort virtually from the beginning. Because this
is well below the triggering threshold of most rights plans, it would be
possible for a target to adopt a second rights plan, although we cau-
tion in Part IV.D about the legal difficulties that attempts to adopt a
second rights plan might encounter.
IV. WHY HAVE RIGHTS PLANS SURVIVED UNSCATHED?
We recognize that this is an "emperor has no clothes" story. No
bidder, no matter how determined, has challenged a rights plan by
simply going ahead with an acquisition, acquiring the triggering
amount of shares, and "swallowing" the pill. If our analysis is correct,
how can determined bidders have ignored the relatively modest costs
of a rights plan? We argue that the widespread employment of poison
pills did not reduce acquisition activity, but merely directed bidders to
employ substitutes for the hostile cash tender offer. These substitutes
include bidding for other more vulnerable targets, coupling tender
offers with proxy fights where boards are not staggered, and negotiat-
ing acceptable terms (including side payments to target managers)
rather than initiating hostile cash tender offers. But the hostile cash
tender offer remained as an ultimate threat. Next, shifts in relative
prices of assets-from a market with what seemed in the 1980s to be
relatively low stock prices to a market in the 1990s that many believe
was overpriced-may have changed bidders' willingness to engage in
high-cost, high-premium cash bids, and pushed many bidders toward
stock exchanges and stock-for-stock mergers. This was accompanied
by changes in corporate governance that reduced target management
resistance to attractive bids. We hesitate to make a "market failure"
argument, although we will outline it below with skepticism. We give
more credence to what John Coates has called the "shadow pill" argu-
ment-that all transactions for control occur in light of the possibility
that a board could swiftly adopt a rights plan, or a second or third
such plan, in the face of a determined bidder.52
52 Coates, supra note 4, at 286.
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A. The Substitution Argument
The advent of the poison pill and its widespread adoption did not
stop all acquisition activity, even though a strong set of takeover de-
fenses might give a target board the power to 'Just say no." Major
drops in acquisition activity seem to coincide with the market fall of
1988, the credit crunch of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 5 3 and the
market drop of 2001. Table 6 summarizes overall acquisition activity
and tender offer activity.
TABLE 6. ACQUISITION & TENDER OFFER ACTIVITY, 1984-2002
All Value Tender Hostile Success
Year Deals (billions) 5 4  Offers 5 5  Tender Offers Rate
1984 2255 $ 152.3 79 18 56%
1985 1728 $ 148.4 84 32 44%
1986 2521 $ 220.1 150 40 38%
1987 2513 $ 194.8 116 31 58%
1988 3008 $ 271.5 217 46 59%
1989 3798 $ 311.0 132 28 77%
1990 4287 $ 200.4 56 8 38%
1991 3513 $ 138.3 20 2 100%
1992 3678 $ 124.8 18 2 50%
1993 3930 $ 168.7 32 3 67%
1994 5301 $ 282.8 70 10 60%
1995 6712 $ 390.5 85 11 55%
1996 7839 $ 570.4 166 8 25%
1997 9115 $ 782.8 160 14 36%
1998 10,806 $1,373.3 179 22 59%
1999 9608 $1,433.7 204 16 50%
2000 9293 $1,792.2 184 14 50%
2001 6499 $1,148.4 106 7 57%
2002 5488 $ 612.6 12 65 20%
It should be obvious that there is no positive correlation between
the presence of poison pills and acquisition activity. By 1986 there
were 380 pill adoptions, with 300 of them in 1986, after the Moran
53 See Comment & Schwert, supra note 1, at 8-10 (describing the decline in junk
bond financing).
54 See 1993 M&A Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1994, at 48; see also
M&A Almanac, MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS, Feb. 2002, at 13, 15. These numbers differ
somewhat from those provided by Mergerstat. See Mergerstat, Mergerstat Free Reports:
M&A Activity, at http://www.mergerstat.com/new/free-reports-m and a-activity.
asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
55 Tender Offers, 2002 MERGERSTAT REV. 39, 39; Tender Offers, 1996 MERGERSTAT
REx'. 38, 38; Tender Offers, 1989 MERGERSTAT REx'. 74, 74. The success rate refers to
contested tender offers.
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decision. 56 By 1989 the number had exceeded 800,5 7 and by 1991
there were approximately 1600 adoptions, including 35% of all NYSE
and AMEX firms. 58 We have previously noted that the current num-
ber is between 2600 and 3000.59 While hostile tender offers dropped
precipitously in 1990 and remained at levels well below the 1980s, ac-
quisition activity was generally influenced by other factors. 60 The so-
called high water mark of 1989 (at least in dollar volume) was ex-
ceeded in every year after 1994, and was more than quadrupled ten
years later in 1999.61 There appears to be little if any impact of pills
on success rates in hostile bids, either: the success rate for 1984-1990
was 52.9%, while the success rate for 1991-2002 was 52.4%.62 Com-
ment and Schwert have addressed the deterrence question more
broadly, and concluded that the evidence does not support the hy-
pothesis that the decline in takeover activity was caused by a combina-
tion of state antitakeover statutes and poison pills. 63 They note, as
others have, that the negative stock price reactions to announcements
of adoption of rights plans have been trivial.
64
While some attribute the decline in takeover activity to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision validating pills65 and its later decision
allowing boards to 'Just say no" if they believed the company was
worth more than an otherwise attractive bid,66 others attribute it to an
economic slowdown, the collapse of the junk bond market, and the
credit crunch following the Savings & Loan crisis. 67 Table 6 makes it
56 Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 377, 386-87 (1988).
57 Blaine V. Fogg et al., Poison Pill Update, in 1 HOSTILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 617, 619 (Dennis J. Block & Harvey L. Pitts eds., 1989).
58 John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark
and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 499, 502 (1998).
59 See supra text accompanying note 1.
60 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
61 See supra Table 6.
62 See supra Table 6.
63 Comment & Schwert, supra note 1, at 5-6, 37-38.
64 Id. at 7-8, 37-38.
65 See authorities cited supra note 6; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). Because only about half of all publicly traded corporations
are incorporated in Delaware, changes in Delaware law could explain no more than
that percentage of any decline, assuming that change was the only causal factor. See
Del. Dep't of State, Delaware Division of Corporations, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/
default.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
66 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12, 1152
(Del. 1989).
67 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 879.
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clear that the decline in the total value of acquisition activity coin-
cided with a recession in the early 1990s. Indeed, the decline in the
number of deals did not occur until 1991, and was only off 18% from
the 1990 high. By 1994, the number of deals had eclipsed the 1980s'
best years, and the total value of deals had more than recovered by
1995. The evidence seems to strongly support the explanation that
market changes explained takeover activity declines.
Georgeson's 1996 study of premia obtained with and without pills
found 105 targets with a poison pill that were acquired. 6 8 Further,
targets with poison pills had a larger proportion of hostile bids than
those without pills. 69 Even more interesting, the presence of a poison
pill did not reduce bid completion rates.70 Table 6 shows that there
were five hostile bids in 2002. We have been able to identify only four
tender offers in 2002 that qualified as hostile, of which all four targets
had poison pills in place. Two of the bidders acquired the targets, 71 in
one case the target agreed to merge with a white knight,72 and in the
fourth the bidder and a white knight combined some of their proper-
ties with those of the target in a new entity.7 3 On June 5, 2003, Oracle
Corp. began a hostile tender offer for PeopleSoft Inc., which has a
rights plan in place.74 All of this suggests that rights plans are not the
deal killers that commentators have thought they were.
What, then, explains the reduction in cash tender offers? First,
during the 1980s, when many acquisitions were apparently driven by
financial restructuring motives, bidders found substitutes for any tar-
get with burdensome takeover defenses, because not all targets were
68 GEORGESON S'HOLDERS COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 32, at 2.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Mentor Graphics acquired IKOS Systems, Inc. and CGI Group, Inc. acquired
Cognicase, Inc. See Thomas Hoffman, Merger Wave Hits Energy IT Vendors, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Feb. 17, 2003, available at http://www.computerworld.com/ indus-
trytopics/energy/story/0,10801,78604,00.html; Press Release, Mentor Graphics,
Mentor Graphics and IKOS Systems Sign Merger Agreement (Mar. 12, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.mentor.com/pressreleases/mar02/mentor-ikos-prhtml.
72 Shaner Hotel Group Limited Partnership abandoned its bid after Interstate
Hotels Corporation agreed to be acquired by MeriStar Hotels & Resorts Inc. Shaner
Hotel Group's Tender for Interstate Hotels Expires, HOTEL NEWS RESOURCE, June 3, 2002,
available at http://www.hotelnewsresource.com/article983.html.
73 Fording Inc. was combined with Teck Cominco Limited, Westshore Terminals
Income Fund and Sherritt Coal Partnership II in February 2003, after a bid first an-
nounced on October 21, 2002. See Press Release, Teck Cominco Ltd., Fording Com-
pletes Transactions: Creates Fording Canadian Coal Trust (Feb. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.teckcominco.com/news/03-archive/03-05-tc.htm.
74 Mylene Mangalindan et al., Software Assault: Oracles Bid for PeopleSoft Offers Possi-
ble Taste of Future, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2003, at Al.
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so armed and cash tender offers for unprotected targets were cheaper
and easier. 75 In an era of financial motivations for acquisitions, many
targets possessed a sufficiently general set of attractive characteristics
so that there were likely to be numerous substitutes for many bidders.
Second, where particular targets offered specific benefits, such as
operating synergies, to particular bidders, tender offers coupled with
proxy fights to replace boards with directors willing to redeem rights
apparently offered a lower cost substitute at companies where boards
were not staggered and otherwise effectively protected. 76 The power
of this approach was demonstrated by the shift to dead hand poison
pills as substitutes for staggered boards.77
Third, if many initially hostile takeover bids ultimately become
negotiated transactions, the pill's added costs for bidders may simply
be reflected in acquisition premiums or termination payments to tar-
get managers to obtain their consent to the transaction. 78 Evidence
supports the conclusion that the presence of pills has raised takeover
premiums, but we are unaware of any studies that show increased
gains to managers of firms with pills. 79 Comment and Schwert have
shown that in the period 1983-1990, 19.4% of firms adopting pills
were put in play within one year of the adoption date-hardly a sign
of powerful deterrence.80
75 But see Coates, supra note 4, at 286-91 (arguing that the potential for quick
adoption of a rights plan-the "shadow pill"-deters bidders as effectively as a previ-
ously adopted pill).
76 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 914, 950 (noting that this was not a
realistic option at targets that had "effective" staggered boards).
77 See generally Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578,
1580-81 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (upholding a "continuing director provision" of a poison
pill plan); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998)
(rejecting a "slow hand" rights plan that precluded redemption by a newly elected
board for six months on the ground that Delaware law did not permit limitations on
directors' power except in the charter); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180,
1189-95 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating a "dead hand" rights plan that completely pre-
cluded a newly elected board from redeeming the rights on similar grounds); Bank of
N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (invali-
dating a rights clause limiting the ability of future board members to redeem rights).
78 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 117-18 (1965) (anticipating the use of "side payments" to secure the con-
sent of incumbent managers).
79 See supra note 32 for studies showing additional takeover premia from 8% to
16% when targets have pills in place.
80 Comment & Schwert, supra note 1, at 22-23.
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Market Changes
Here we argue that relative prices of assets at least partly explain
the reduced numbers of hostile cash tender offers during an era of
expanding acquisition activity in the 1990s. We do not propose to
recite the entire history of takeovers in the 1980s, when poison pills
were developed. We note only that it was an era when enormous prof-
its from takeovers-whether hostile cash bids or leveraged buyouts
(LBOs)-were possible.8 1 Gains to target shareholders provide part
of the evidence of these opportunities.8 2 The other side showed re-
markable gains to early LBO buyers who identified underperforming
companies, bought them and restructured them.
8 3
While there is evidence that, on average, bidders did not do so
well during the 1980s8 4 (earning either normal or slightly below nor-
mal returns on their investments in targets), averages sometimes mask
81 During the 1980s, leveraged buyouts produced premiums for pre-buyout inves-
tors of 40-50%. See generally Krishna G. Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyouts, 27J.
FIN. ECON. 247, 248 (1990) ("Research shows that pre-buyout investors reap substan-
tial wealth gains from LBOs .... [f]or 76 management buyouts completed in the
period 1980-1986, pre-buy-out equity holders earn a median premium of 42% over
the equity value two months before the buyout.") (citations omitted).
82 See generally Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 51-52 (citing several studies
concluding that from 1981 to 1986, premiums paid to shareholders in change-of-con-
trol transactions totaled $118.4 billion, with estimates of average positive returns at
19% in the 1960s, between 27% and 30% in the 1970s, and between 21% and 53.2%
in the early 1980s); Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314, 315
(John C. Coffee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (estimating shareholder gains from mergers and
acquisitions at $40 billion between 1981 and 1985); Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n., Grundfest Study Shows Takeovers Sharply Increase Shareholder Wealth
(Sept. 29, 1987) (on file with author) (reporting that Grundfest study found total
shareholder gains of $167 billion between 1981 and 1986). A recent study found
average premiums around 35% for both cash transactions and stock mergers. Law-
rence Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock for Stock Mergers and Some Consequences for the Law
of Director Fiduciay Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
83 Gains to buyers apparently came from improved post-buyout profitability. See
Palepu, supra note 81, at 249. The underlying theory was provided by Henry G.
Manne, supra note 78, at 113. One detailed account of how these gains were achieved
appears in Joel M. Stem et al., The EVA Financial Management System, 8, No. 2 BANK OF
Am.J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1995, at 32. The gains in the LBO of Safeway were
reported to have been more than $5 billion on an equity investment of $130 million,
while KKR's investors in the buyout of Beatrice Foods were estimated to have earned a
43% return on their investments. Tony Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts:
The Ever Changing Landscape, 13 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 109, 113-14 (2000).
84 See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV.
597, 602, 637-38 (1989).
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high profits for the innovators because imitators compete these profits
away in later transactions. Large profits were available for some buy-
ers, and some of these transactions were driven by gains from im-
proved management and financial restructuring-gains available to a
wide range of potential buyers.
8 5
It is, however, indisputable that hostile tender offer activity de-
clined after 1989. The prevalence of rights plans is suspect as an ex-
planation when one considers that the success rate on hostile bids was
at an all-time high in 1989, as shown in Table 6. As stock market
prices rose dramatically during the 1990s, cash tender offers and
LBOs became a much smaller portion of the mergers and acquisition
picture and were replaced by negotiated mergers.8 6 Asset prices had
risen to the point where cash purchases seemed too costly for many
bidders, who may have preferred to use their own highly valued stock
as the medium of exchange.8 7 Further, the Delaware courts favored
stock "mergers of equals" over alternatives by according target man-
agement greater discretion in selecting a favored partner.88 Mergers
are necessarily negotiated transactions where rights plans, which de-
pend on outright ownership of target company shares by a bidder,
play no role except to the extent that the redemption of rights is a
condition of the agreement. Subramanian argues that negotiated
transactions were facilitated in the 1990s by the widespread use of
golden parachutes, and by the fact that target managers' stock options
were often deep in the money and would vest on a change in con-
trol.8 9 In some cases, mergers for synergies were risky, and buyers
could share the risk with sellers by using stock rather than cash. Fi-
nally, mergers are more tax efficient for target shareholders, which
may explain some of the reduction in premiums observed in the past
85 The story of declining returns to LBOs over time is recounted in Stern et al.,
supra note 83.
86 The DowJones Industrial Average opened 1990 at 2810.15, and closed 1999 at
11,497.12. Dow Jones & Co., Dow Jones Averages, at http://www.djindexes.com/jsp/
industrialaverages.jsp?sideMenu=true.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
87 See Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions,
29J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at n.25) (providing examples of acqui-
sitions using what in hindsight appears to have been over-valued stock).
88 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153-54
(Del. 1989). But see William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1291 & n.ll (2001)
(criticizing Paramount opinion for giving "inadequate guidance to corporate
lawyers").
89 Subramanian, supra note 87.
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when compared to cash tender offers.90 As stock prices rose in the
1990s the burden of taxes on capital gains became relatively greater,
making tax-free reorganizations relatively more attractive than cash
bids.
Some commentators have suggested that corporate governance
changes have also played a role in the reduction of management's
resistance to bids, and thus, the reduction in hostile tender offers.91
These changes include increases in the number and independence of
outside directors. 9 2 Compensation of executives has changed over the
past decade-with increasing portions of compensation composed of
stock and stock options, both of which align managers' incentives with
those of stockholders and tend to reduce resistance to bids.93 With
rising stock prices putting more options "in the money" and wide-
spread use of golden parachute severance agreements, managers had
increased incentives to agree to sales of their companies. None of
these forces are related to the prevalence of rights plans in the 1990s.
C. The Market Failure Argument
We are loathe to make general claims of market failure in the
market for corporate control. There is the possibility that no pills
were swallowed because most legal advisers have regarded the rights
plan as an impregnable defense when coupled with a staggered board.
We have previously cited the legal literature about rights plans that
generally describes them as deal killers.9 4 There is almost no legal
literature that acknowledges that rights plans are anything less.
9 5
While lawyers developed rights plans, and presumably those who de-
90 Compare Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Con-
trot: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 10-14 (1983) (stating that returns to
target shareholders in tender offers averaged 29.1%, while returns to target share-
holders in mergers averaged 15.9%), with Hamermesh, supra note 82 (finding
equivalent premiums in cash and stock mergers).
91 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 881-84.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 884; see also Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, Agency Theory, Manage-
rial Welfare and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54, 60-61 (1984) (finding
that executives who do not contest offers stand to gain from two to six times as much
as executives who oppose offers).
94 See supra notes 2, 6.
95 But see 1 FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 27, at 5-17 ("What the pill
achieves ... is a meaningful degree of economic deterrence."); Velasco, supra note 2,
at 868 ("The antidote proposed in this Article would allow the acquirer to anticipate
the dilution of the poison pill and account for it in the initial bid. By doing so, it
would allow the acquirer to trigger the poison pill without ingesting its economic
poison.").
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veloped them understand them, the lawyers appear reticent about the
plans' limits-not a surprising position for those who have developed
profit centers for their law firms. Whether other lawyers understand
the limits of rights plans is less obvious. Indeed, the widespread ac-
ceptance of the "deal killer" story suggests that most lawyers, and per-
haps especially academic lawyers who write much of the commentary,
have not done the relatively simple arithmetic contained in this
Article.
Whether investment bankers suffer from the same disabilities is
much more problematic. The calculations necessary to determine the
costs of swallowing a pill are well within the competence of every
young analyst at every investment banking firm that advises bidders.
But are these calculations as obvious when faced with a forty-page,
single-spaced product of the best lawyers? Few documents are as im-
penetrable as a rights plan, with its elaborate definitions (often buried
within the text) and its antidilution and antidestruction provisions,
much less its extraneous matter, such as rights to purchase preferred
stock that will never be exercised. Do the lawyers' onslaughts of boil-
erplate put off the analysts who work primarily with financial calcula-
tors? While this is a possibility, especially in the face of highly
confident takeover defense lawyers who assert the invulnerability of
these plans, we have difficulty making a very strong argument along
these lines.
One piece of evidence of failure in the market for information
about rights plans comes from the resources spent opposing them.
TIAA-CREF has waged a four-year war against "dead hand" pills-pills
that cannot be redeemed by a board elected through a bidder's suc-
cessful proxy fight.9 6 Since 1998, fifty-seven companies have yielded
to TIAA-CREF's demand to remove dead hand pills. The most recent
company to come under pressure from TIAA-CREF in the 2002 proxy
season was PRG-Schultz International, Inc.
9 7
The latest target of corporate governance activists is Aetna, and
the attackers are the California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CALPERS) and Providence Capital, Inc., a New York investment
bank under the leadership of Herbert Denton. 98 Both want Aetna to
allow their shareholders to vote on whether to implement a poison
96 Ron Orol, TIAA's Iron Fist on 'Dead-Hand,' THE DEAL.COM, May 8, 2002, at
http://www.thedeal.com/NASApp/cs/Con. . ./PrinterFriendly&ArtID=1020726043
70 (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
97 Id.
98 Ron Orol, CALPERS Wants Aetna to Change Governance Measures, THE DEAL.COM,
Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.thedeal.com/NASApp/cs/Con. . ./StandardArticle&c=
TDDArticle&cid=10176724837 (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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pill. Most recently, Denton and Providence were successful in per-
suading the boards of Alaska Air and Great Lakes Chemical to remove
their poison pills after threatening proxy fights for positions on the
board.99 Great Lakes' board succumbed only after shareholders at
the 1999 and 2000 annual meetings opposed poison pills in non-bind-
ing votes.100 Denton has a new and more controversial approach to
the battle over pills: he has asked several fund managers to support a
bylaw proposal that would bar directors from running for re-election
if they refuse to remove poison pills after shareholders vote to elimi-
nate them.101
All this maneuvering is costly for both sides. Proxy battles con-
sume considerable resources, and Denton's request for financial con-
tributions to a proposed $1 million war chest is the best evidence of
these costs. 10 2 Is it worth it? Or is this a tempest in a teapot? Do the
opponents really understand the device they are criticizing? The in-
crease in sale proceeds where targets have adopted rights plans is con-
vincing evidence that bidders do understand them. These premia are
reported to range between 8% and 16%, which is consistent with our
model.
103
D. The "Shadow Pill" Argument
We begin with the obvious question: if a bidder is willing to suffer
the dilution costs of a single rights plan on its way to a complete acqui-
sition, why cannot a target simply adopt a new rights plan each time
one set of rights is exhausted? John Coates has called the possibility of
quick adoption of a rights plan by any firm the "shadow pill."10 4 But
there are problems with Coates' analysis when it is extended to the
repeated adoption of rights plans in the face of a determined bidder.
The shadow pill must be adopted with the formality of the origi-
nal pill, which requires a board to consider once again any threats
currently posed, most importantly the inadequacy of the bid, and per-
haps to obtain a new valuation opinion from investment bankers
which may in some cases require a higher valuation than the banker
had previously given-an embarrassment, if not a fatal flaw, in the
99 Id.
100 Providence Announces Shareholder Victory at Great Lakes Chemical, PR NEWSWIRE,
Feb. 13, 2002, available at LEXIS, Wire Service Stories File.
101 Charles Sisk, Poison Pills May Be Deadly for Directors, THE DEAL.COM, Oct. 11,
2001, at http://208.185.43.170/NASApp/cs/Cont. . ./StandardArticle&c=TDDArti-
cle&cid=100386515991 (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
102 Id.
103 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
104 Coates, supra note 4, at 277.
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processes surrounding adoption.10 5 In the meantime, a determined
bidder may be in a position to engage in a "street sweep," in which it
purchases a controlling interest in the target through arbitrageurs-a
process that may be completed in a single day. 10 6 The likelihood that
this will be feasible is increased by the bidder's strategy of announcing
its intended takeover efforts before triggering the rights, in order to
increase the market price and reduce the number of shares for which
they are exercisable. 10 7 Once the bidder has gained control, Delaware
law imposes strict constraints on any attempt to dilute the voting
power of a new controlling shareholder. 08
Other problems also weaken the deterrent power of the shadow
pill. Conventional preferred stock rights plans require the presence
105 For a recounting of cases in which investment bankers have ratcheted up valua-
tion opinions, see William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We
Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q 523, 524, nn.4-10 (1992). A valuation
opinion may be required to show that, even taking into account the additional funds
transferred to target shareholders by the bidder's dilution, the bid price is still inade-
quate. A valuation is also generally required for the standard preferred stock pill,
where the exercise price is set at the long-term expected value of the common stock.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. These numbers, as we point out, tend
toward absurdity.
106 See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (recount-
ing the acquisition of 25% of the shares of SCM in two hours, in five negotiated trans-
actions with arbitrageurs). This was not unique in this era. Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC swept the street for 23.7% of the stock of Newmont Mining Corporation in two
days, increasing its ownership to 49.7%. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1336-37, 1340 (Del. 1987). Most impressively, Campeau Corporation
bought 48% of the stock of Allied Stores Corporation in 27 minutes. Dale A. Oes-
terle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DuKE L.J. 202, 202.
107 See supra Part II.B.4. Among the difficulties to be surmounted are avoiding
regulation as a tender offer and the notice requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)). See generally Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.
Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that the purchase of 34% of another com-
pany's stock qualified as a tender offer for purposes of the Williams Act), affd on other
grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982). HSR requirements include thirty days' notice of
significant acquisitions (fifteen days if a cash tender offer), which presumably would
apply to most hostile acquisitions. While HSR filings will notify markets of intended
purchases at an early stage, we have assumed such notice in our examples.
108 Once a bidder gains control, the target (subsidiary) board owes it a fiduciary
duty not to issue new shares to dilute its control. Frantz Mfg. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d
401, 408 (Del. 1985); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del.
Ch. 1967); Canada S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813 (Del. Ch.
1953). More recent cases impose a strict, almost insurmountable burden on a target
board under such circumstances. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118,
1128-32 (Del. 2003); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660-63 (Del. Ch.
1988).
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of an investment banker or other financial expert to render an opin-
ion on the long-term value of the company-a number that will grow
less credible with each increase in the takeover bid, and a number
that must increase the estimate of long-term value to four or five times
the present value in order to give a subsequent rights plan sufficient
dilutive power. While investment bankers may earn their fees for such
heroic assumptions, they add little value to the credibility of the adop-
tion of a second or third rights plan. 10 9
There are serious, if not insurmountable, difficulties in defend-
ing the adoption of a second rights plan in the middle of a takeover
battle. Since the Unocal decision, at least Delaware courts have en-
gaged in heightened scrutiny of takeover defense tactics because of
the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests .... "110 The seminal Delaware decision on the legality
of rights plans noted that the adoption of a plan "to ward off possible
future advances and not a mechanism adopted in reaction to a spe-
cific threat" was entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule, after first applying the Unocal test." 'I The lesson of current Dela-
ware law, from a target board's standpoint, is that adopting a rights
plan before any threat appears obtains the maximum deference for
the board's decision. The board, with help from its advisers, can sim-
ply imagine all the possible threats a bidder might pose, and adopt a
rights plan to protect against all of them.' 12
With few exceptions, 113 in the 1980s courts applying the Unocal
test were relatively permissive in allowing boards to decline to redeem
existing rights plans, to the point that it appeared the "Nancy Reagan
Defense" ('just say no")114 was a viable option for many target boards
109 Recall the Chancery Court's description of some estimates of Time Inc.'s finan-
cial advisers, about the expected value of the Time-Warner merger, as involving "a
range that a Texan might feel at home on [sic]." Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 724 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1989).
110 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
111 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding that once a rights plan had bought a target's board sufficient time to formu-
late an alternative transaction, the board was obligated to redeem the rights and allow
the shareholders to exercise their own judgment about the preferable choice). But
see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)
(disapproving "of such a narrow and rigid construction of Unocal' ).
114 See Robert A. Prentice &John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy
Reagan Defense". May Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 382 n.22 (1990) (explaining the "Nancy Reagan Defense").
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Boards were permitted to reject bids where they determined that the
stock was undervalued by the market,' 15 and where boards deter-
mined that shareholders might misunderstand management's repre-
sentations of intrinsic values and future expectations.'
1 6
The negative implication of Moran is clear. Once a bidder ap-
pears, the Delaware Chancery Court is likely to be far more skeptical
about the "threats" posed by a bidder. In the past, the Chancery
Court has also been more skeptical about the preclusiveness of some
defenses. 1 7 Where a bid is not structurally coercive, as in the case of
a two-tier bid (and today none are), the only remaining threat is "sub-
stantive coercion"-that the price is too low, and that naive sharehold-
ers will be fooled into tendering.118 The negative implications were
115 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1370,1385 (Del. 1995)
(noting that the record appeared to support Unitrin's argument that its board
adopted the plan in response to a number of threats: (1) the board's belief that the
stock was worth more than the bid price; (2) the tender offer did not reflect the long
term business prospects of the target; (3) the "true value" of the target was not re-
flected in its market price; (4) the target was well positioned, by virtue of its financial
strength, to "pursue [hypothetical] strategic and financial opportunities"; and (5)
that the merger would have anticompetitive effects).
116 See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545,
1560-61 (D. Del. 1995):
The favorable results from the board's past actions are now beginning to be
translated into financial results which even surpass management and finan-
cial analyst projections, and the financial data which manifests these results
are facts only known to [the directors] .... The Court therefore finds that
Moore's tender offer poses a threat to Wallace that shareholders, because
they are uninformed, will cash out before realizing the fruits of the substan-
tial technological innovations achieved by Wallace.
Id.; Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 289-90 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(finding that the board, having won the liability portion of a patent infringement suit,
was entitled to prevent shareholders from tendering their shares in the absence of the
board's ability to disclose the settlement value of the case); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v.
Prime Computer, 14 DEL.J. CoRp. L. 1086, 1093 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988), available at
1988 WL 140221, *4 ("Prime has recently obtained new management and is only now
on the verge of reaping the economic benefits of its recent acquisition of
Computervision.").
117 Compare AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114
(Del. Ch. 1986) (holding a self-tender was an unreasonable reaction to a bid because
of its coerciveness), with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (holding that a corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders).
118 RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defen-
sive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 267 (1989).
See generally Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.17
(Del. 1989) (noting the concept of "substantive coercion" as coined by Gilson and
Kraackman); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 324 (Del. Ch. 2000) (acknowl-
edging the concept of "substantive coercion" as coined by Gilson and Kraackman).
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fully realized in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, where Shorewood Corpora-
tion adopted a series of takeover defenses in addition to its poison
pill.1 19 While the defenses in question, which were designed to pro-
tect a staggered board, did not involve a poison pill (which had al-
ready been adopted),120 the case emphasizes the current judicial
skepticism about the need for harsh takeover defenses once a battle
has begun. Vice Chancellor Strine, applying the Unocal test, held that
Shorewood's board faced "only a modest threat of price inade-
quacy,"1 21 in view of the fact that 80% of its stock was held by manage-
ment and institutional investors, that the stock was followed by
analysts who had discussed all of Shorewood's underappreciated de-
velopments, and that Shorewood management had "strong credibil-
ity" within the investment community that allowed it to communicate
anything to its stockholders.1 22
Once an initial rights plan has been put in place, objections to
further rights plans based on a lack of a plausible threat may well
plague many attempts to adopt subsequent rights plans, using the ar-
guments employed by Vice Chancellor Strine in Chesapeake.123 First,
many target firms will have a majority of their stock held by sophisti-
cated institutional investors capable of understanding the target's dis-
closures about its business prospects. Second, the beginning of a
takeover battle will push shares formerly held by many shareholders,
including less informed individuals, into the hands of risk arbi-
trageurs, also sophisticated investors. Third, the presence of a follow-
ing by a number of analysts, who periodically report on the target, will
further undermine arguments that the target's stock is undervalued
and that investors don't appreciate its prospects. Fourth, at some time
after the beginning of a takeover battle, some courts will conclude
that target management has had ample time to inform investors or to
undertake alternative strategies to enhance shareholder value. 124 Fi-
nally, because of the perception of some courts that conventional
rights plans are deal killers that render a target invulnerable, a bid-
der's willingness to absorb the initial round of dilution might con-
119 Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 296.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 297.
122 Id. at 307-08.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Sutton Holding Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., 16 DEL.J. CORP. L. 434, 447-48
(Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del.
Ch. 1988); see also Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Nev.
1997) (applying Nevada law). But see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del. 1989) (criticizing the City Capital Assocs. decision).
[VOL. 79:1
ILLUSORY PROTECTIONS OF THE POISON PILL
vince a court that a repeat performance, especially after the onset of a
takeover battle, is an excessive (or preclusive) response.
One could argue that cases such as Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, and
other cases in which the Chancery Court has rejected takeover de-
fenses under the Unocal standard, 125 are departures from the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's more relaxed review under Unitrin v. American
General Corp.,126 and its progeny. Unitrin appeared to review each
takeover defense separately, rather than in the context of a panoply of
defenses, and only frowned on those found "preclusive" or "coer-
cive." 127 But the matter is not so simple, as demonstrated by two re-
cent cases in which the Supreme Court applied a stricter standard of
review than the Chancery Court. In MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,
128
the Supreme Court reversed a Chancery Court holding that the strict
standard of scrutiny ("compelling justification") required by Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.129 was not implicated in board action to add
two directors to a staggered board in advance of a proxy fight.1 30 At
least in the context of shareholder voting, the court found that the
Blasius standard must be applied within Unoca's proportionality
requirement.131
Recently, in Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,132 the Supreme
Court reversed the Chancery Court and held that a deal protection
device-a voting agreement with controlling shareholders approved
by the target corporation-was to be scrutinized under Unocal. The
device failed that scrutiny because it precluded public (minority)
shareholders from voting in a meaningful manner on a merger propo-
sal. In its analysis, the court first broadened the scope of a Unocal
review to include the full range of takeover defenses in place. 133 Sec-
ond, and perhaps most importantly for our analysis, the court clarified
that a "preclusive or coercive" examination was not the end of Unocal
scrutiny, but was to occur before the court's "focus shifts to the 'range
of reasonableness' in making a proportionality determination." 134 In
effect, the court may have reversed the relaxed standard of propor-
125 See, e.g., City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 790-91.
126 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
127 See Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995).
128 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
129 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
130 MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1120.
131 Id. at 1131.
132 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
133 Id. at 932 ("If a 'board's defensive actions are inextricably related, the princi-
ples of Unocal require that such actions be scrutinized collectively as a unitary re-
sponse to the perceived threat.'" (quoting Unityin, 651 A.2d at 1387)).
134 Id. at 932.
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tionality employed in Unitrin. This decision illustrates the difficulty in
predicting the level of, as well as the result of, judicial scrutiny in the
control transaction area. Corporate advisers will be hard pressed to
assure target boards that they can adopt a second rights plan in the
middle of a contest with any degree of confidence.1
35
The irony of a discussion of the feasibility of a second rights plan
is that even a second rights plan adds only about 40% to the bidder's
initial estimate of the cost of an acquisition, which, in the case of a
seriously undervalued target, may not be enough to assure sharehold-
ers receive full value for their company. 13 6 While undervaluation by
as much as 40% may seem extreme, the recent NASDAQ bubble saw
such disparities in relative values of "old economy" and "new econ-
omy" companies that led, in some cases, to takeovers using overvalued
stock. 13 7 By March 2000, airline stocks had fallen 43% from their fifty-
two week highs. The ten major U.S. airlines had 1999 profits of $4.8
billion, with a total market capitalization of only $25 billion, or a little
more than five times trailing earnings. 138 Chemical companies faced
similar problems, with the price of companies such as W.R. Grace &
135 Even Chancery Court judges have been known to complain about the difficul-
ties of applying the various standards ofjudicial review of director action that are now
part of Delaware corporate jurisprudence. See Allen et al., supra note 88, at 1298.
136 We assume that the bidder acquires the initial 15% as before which is diluted
as before. Then we assume the bidder acquires sufficient fully diluted shares to once
again reach 15%, only to be diluted again, before acquiring all remaining shares in an
any and all tender offer followed by a takeout merger at the same price-a 50% pre-
mium over the pre-acquisition market price (adjusted for dilution). The following
equation demonstrates the bidder's expected costs of returning to a 15% ownership
position after an initial dilution:
L = ma- (mx + p) (a) + m'a'- (m'x'+ p') (a')
x + d x'+ d'
where primes indicate the second transaction. This results in an added cost for the
bidder of $6,136,350, using our previous example of a bidder that, after suffering the
first round of dilution, accepts a second round of dilution at the 15% ownership level
after adopting a second rights plan.
137 See Subramanian, supra note 87:
Using stock valued at $31 per share, Worldcom outbid GTE and British
Telecom to acquire MCI in November 1997. By 2001, Worldcom was trading
at $15 per share; in July 2002 it filed for bankruptcy protection. Using stock
trading at $74 per share, AOL acquired Time Warner in January 2000; by
October 2000, it was trading at $45 per share and by June 2002 AOL-Time
Warner was trading at $10.
Id. (manuscript at n.25).
138 Scott McCartney et al., Flight Plans: Feeling Undervalued, Some Airlines Consider
Bumping Stockholders, WALL ST.J., Mar. 10, 2000, atAl. In hindsight, airline stocks may
well have been overvalued at $25 billion, in view of the subsequent Chapter 11 filings
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Company dropping by more than 50% from their fifty-two week highs
by early 2000.139 Borders Book Group, frustrated by its stock price
(probably in comparison with money-losing Amazon.com), an-
nounced that it would consider a leveraged buyout.1 40 Even some
stocks that might well have been treated as "new economy" stocks suf-
fered by comparison to others. In early 2000, 3Com was apparently
out of favor with high tech investors because it made dowdy products
such as modems, switches and basic components for computer net-
works. Its wholly-owned subsidiary, Palm, Inc., made Palm organizers,
a more glamorous product. 3Com made an initial public offering of
4.1% of its Palm stock, which had an aggregate market value of $32
billion by March 14, 2000-greater than the market value of 3Com
($19 billion), which owned the remaining 95% of Palm's stock.
141
With this kind of market valuation, Palm could have acquired the en-
tire U.S. airline industry for 78% of its stock (assuming no control
premium). In 2000, shareholders of Digex brought a derivative action
alleging that Digex's parent seized a corporate opportunity by selling
itself rather than its more valuable subsidiary at a time when the mar-
ket capitalization of the parent, Intermedia Communications, Inc.,
was $1.2 billion and the market value of its 54% interest in Digex was
worth $3.3 billion. 42 In none of these cases would a second rights
plan have raised the targets' prices high enough to deter bidders who
believed the targets were undervalued.
E. The Uncertain Bidder Argument
For bidders at the margin-uncertain of success either because of
doubts about whether a target is worth a substantial premium or if
they are the highest valuing potential bidders, early indications of lack
of success at low premium levels might lead to an unwillingness to
trigger the rights plan. If a bidder were required to invest as much as
15% of the value of the target and risked losing 40% or more of that
investment if it were unsuccessful, the risk may add substantially to the
bidder's anticipated costs in the event of failure. 143 But we must em-
phasize that for determined bidders able to pay a premium of a sub-
stantial size for a target, this added cost might not be a deterrent. At
of major carriers. But before Sept. 11, 2001, managers of airlines could have reasona-
bly believed that their firms were undervalued compared to dot.com stocks.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Frank Partnoy, Strange New Math of Palm, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A23.
142 Derivative Complaint at 3-4, Sinha v. Ruberg (Del. Ch. 2000) (No. 18391NC),
available at http://webman.widener.edu/documents/complaints/18391-001.pdf.
143 We thank Julian Velasco for this suggestion.
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the very least it should not deter all bids. Further, a cautious bidder,
concerned that a competing bidder might make a higher bid after the
first bidder had accepted the costs of dilution, can acquire just under
the triggering amount 144 and await competing bids before proceeding
to accept the dilution imposed by the pill. But this only makes our
initial point-that the bidder losses from triggering pills, while signifi-
cant, will only deter some bidders at the margin, where their valua-
tions of targets are on the low end of the distribution of target
valuations or where the bidder lacks unique synergies with the target
that would allow it to outbid potential competitors.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that typical rights plans have modest
power to deter a determined bidder willing to pay a significant pre-
mium. First, low thresholds for the exercise of rights mean that the
bidder's initial investment that is subject to dilution is relatively small.
Second, the relatively high exercise price, typically at 50% of market,
has the effect of causing one-half of the shares subject to the rights to
be issued at full market value, leaving a much smaller number of dilut-
ing shares. Third, as the target's stock price rises over time, the num-
ber of shares to be issued per right can decline and further reduce the
dilutive effect of exercise if the exercise price is set at the initiation of
the rights plan.
We have shown that the growth of rights plans as takeover de-
fenses is likely not the explanation for a decline in hostile takeover
bids, and that, indeed, such bids continue for companies with rights
plans. The decline in the employment of hostile cash tender offers is
more likely explained by other factors, such as rising stock prices dur-
ing the 1990s, the greater inclination of target boards and managers
to accept takeover offers, and the use of proxy fights to secure re-
demption of rights plans. One wonders what percentage of the pill's
expected costs are represented by increased side payments to target
management, in the form of agreements to pay out golden parachutes
without contest, or consulting arrangements.
One legal question remains. If current rights plans are as mild as
we suggest, what effect does this conclusion have on judicial attitudes
about duties of boards to redeem rights which were formerly thought
to be preclusive of bids?
144 Or under 9.9%, to avoid exposure to short-swing trading liability under 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000).
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